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THE PARCHED EARTH OF COOPERATION: HOW 
TO SOLVE THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS IN 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
GOVERNANCE 
BRYAN H. DRUZIN* 
ABSTRACT 
This article proposes a way to strengthen international environmental 
agreements, such as the Paris Agreement and the Kyoto Protocol. 
Multilateral environmental agreements such as these are extremely fragile. 
At the heart of the problem is what is known as the tragedy of the commons—
a unique dynamic that viciously sabotages cooperation. The cause of this 
tragedy is that no one can trust that other actors will conserve the common 
resource, which triggers a race to the bottom—a race to deplete. Global 
warming and our inability to halt it is perhaps the ultimate example of a 
tragedy of the commons on a truly massive scale. On a domestic level, the 
tragedy of the commons is easily solved through regulation. However, on a 
supranational level, where there is no overarching authority, governance 
mechanisms tend to collapse. The hard truth is that without robust 
enforcement of some kind, international cooperation is extremely difficult to 
maintain. This article proposes the following idea: governments joining (or 
already party to) an agreement, contribute an upfront deposit to an 
international regulatory body (the Commons Management Fund (“CMF”)) 
with the understanding that their contribution will be forfeited if they fail to 
honor their treaty commitments. The idea, while ostensibly simple, is 
deceptively complex. The focus is not the penalty, but rather the ability of 
governments to credibly signal commitment. In game theory, credible 
signaling can prevent a tragedy of the commons by generating confidence 
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that everyone will stick to their commitments. The CMF is designed to exploit 
this effect. Now, more than ever, a solution to the tragedy of the commons 
on a supranational level is desperately needed—the CMF is such a solution. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
International environmental governance remains shockingly anemic. 
While there is now global consensus regarding the magnitude of the threat 
posed by the ecological crisis before us, our ability to take meaningful action 
to halt or at least slow its advance is profoundly constrained. The problem is 
that the basic architecture of the international system is anarchic: “[n]one is 
entitled to command; none is required to obey.”1 The international 
community lacks a central authority capable of enforcing cooperation. In the 
absence of such enforcement, uncertainty between states as to the strength 
 
 1.  KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 88 (1979).  
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of each other’s commitment reliably undermines attempts at collective 
action. The hard truth is that without enforcement of some kind, robust 
international cooperation will remain elusive. 
Consider the recent Paris Agreement on climate change. The agreement 
was a remarkable achievement in international diplomacy. Nearly every state 
in the world—from North Korea to the United States—pledged to reduce 
their greenhouse gas emissions.2 Yet governments face no consequences if 
they fall short of their commitments under the agreement. The agreement 
thus stands enfeebled upon the shaky edifice of verbal commitments and 
good will. Consensus of this kind is extremely fragile. Even a trickle of states 
exiting the agreement will, in all likelihood, trigger the withdrawal of more 
governments and bring about the total collapse of the agreement. Multilateral 
environmental agreements are uniquely susceptible to this pattern of failure.3 
This is because for an environmental treaty to work effectively, everyone 
needs to be onboard and everyone needs to stay onboard. 
The inability to manage a common resource in the absence of an 
overarching authority is by no means a new or unrecognized problem—it has 
been understood for centuries.4 The inability to effectively coordinate the use 
of an open-access resource and the disastrous consequences that may flow 
from failing to do so is known as the tragedy of the commons.5 A tragedy of 
the commons exists where a group of actors behaving rationally and in-line 
with their self-interests depletes a common resource, undermining the entire 
group’s long-term interests (along with their own), yet the prevailing 
equilibrium forces precisely this outcome. The cause of this tragedy is that 
no one can trust that their partners will not overexploit the resource, which 
invariably triggers a destructive race to the bottom. The true ‘tragedy’ in the 
tragedy of the commons is that actors otherwise willing to husband a 
resource are forced by rational self-interest to ‘grab what they can.’ Global 
warming and our inability to halt it is perhaps the ultimate example of a 
 
 2.  Joby Warrick & Chris Mooney, 196 Countries Approve Historic Climate Agreement, WASH. 
POST (Dec. 12, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2015/12/12/prop 
osed-historic-climate-pact-nears-final-vote/ [https://perma.cc/Y2GA-KREG].   
 3.  Bilateral environmental agreements (where the agreement is between two nation states) are also 
vulnerable to this model of collapse. However, because the dynamic involves only two players, the pattern 
plays out in a less obvious sequential fashion and may be easier to forestall.  
 4.  See Amy Sinden, The Tragedy of the Commons and the Myth of a Private Property Solution, 
78 U. COLO. L. REV. 533, 534–35 (2007). 
 5.  The concept was first formulated in a rigorous way by Garrett Hardin. See Garret Hardin, The 
Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1248 (1968). Other terminology used to describe this social 
dilemma or aspects thereof include: resource dilemma, take-some dilemma, and common-pool resource. 
For a good overview of these descriptors and some of the structural conditions that make up the dilemma, 
see MARGARET FODDY, ET AL., RESOLVING SOCIAL DILEMMAS: DYNAMIC, STRUCTURAL, AND 
INTERGROUP ASPECTS 9 (2013). 
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tragedy of the commons on a truly massive scale. On a domestic level, the 
tragedy of the commons is easily solved through regulation. On a 
supranational level, however, preventing a tragedy of the commons is 
extremely tricky. Because there is no authority able to coordinate the 
behavior of the relevant stakeholders, governance mechanisms tend to 
collapse. 
According to neoclassical welfare economics, there are two solutions to 
the tragedy of the commons. The first is top-down regulation, and the second 
is privatization of the resource.6 However, both solutions falter on the 
international level. The fragmented structure of the international community 
precludes solving the tragedy of the commons using regulation as it is 
deployed in the domestic realm. The second solution, privatization, is a 
radical concept fraught with serious logistical and normative challenges. 
This article proposes the following idea: governments joining (or already 
party to) an agreement contribute an upfront deposit to an international 
regulatory body (the Commons Management Fund (“CMF”)) with the 
understanding that their contribution will be forfeited if they fail to honor 
their treaty commitments. The idea, while ostensibly simple, is in fact 
deceptively complex. The focus is not the penalty, but rather the ability of 
governments to credibly signal commitment. In game theory, credible 
signaling between actors can prevent a tragedy of the commons from 
forming by generating confidence that everyone will stick to their 
commitments. There is a sizeable literature on signaling in both economics 
and political science, as well as other disciplines.7 The proposal is designed 
to exploit this effect. The model is particularly well-suited for treaties 
exhibiting a tragedy-of-the-commons dynamic because the problem in such 
cases is primarily one of perception, and this model targets perceptions more 
effectively than alternative compliance mechanisms. 
 
 6.  Hardin proposes “mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon” i.e. state regulation. Hardin, supra 
note 5, at 1247. Alternatively, Hardin suggests that the commons may be sold off as private property. Id. 
at 1245. Note, however, that Hardin also postulates that common ownership pools may also solve the 
dilemma. See id. at 1245–46; see also ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION 
OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 37–46 (James E. Alt & Douglass C. North eds., 1990) 
(arguing that common-pool problems may be solved by voluntary organizations rather than by a coercive 
state or privatization); Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1388–91 (1993) 
(observing that close-knit social groups often develop strategies that can prevent the tragedy of the 
commons). Unfortunately, the international community is the very antithesis of a close-knit social group.  
 7.  For example, costly signaling has been proposed in the IR literature as a method for solving the 
security dilemma, the situation in which states, seeking only to strengthen their own military security, 
escalate tensions and increase the likelihood of conflict, although neither side desire it. See generally 
Evan Braden Montgomery, Breaking out of the Security Dilemma, 31 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 151 
(2006). Costly signaling theory is also found in evolutionary biology. See infra note 98 and accompanying 
text.   
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The discussion that follows focuses primarily on the resource of water. 
The global, unconfined nature of water makes it an ideal case study through 
which to examine commons management on a supranational level. The 
reader should note, however, that the model may be applied to any common-
pool resource. The proposal can, in principle, solve the tragedy of the 
commons across the board. With the continuing destruction of the global 
commons,8 the international community desperately needs a mechanism to 
strengthen international environmental governance. If the tragedy of the 
commons cannot be brought to heel, the collective prosperity and perhaps 
even the very survival of our species is threatened. Yet given the current 
political and legal fragmentation of the world, the task of sustaining 
coordinated action on such a massive scale is formidable. This difficulty, 
however, does not impugn its possibility; it merely speaks to the inadequacy 
of our current governance structures. The supranational nature of the global 
commons requires a new way to maintain the agreements we make. It is the 
aim of this article to lay out the broad strokes of such an approach. 
My argument unfolds in three parts. Part II explains the tragedy of the 
commons and analyzes it in terms of the prisoner’s dilemma. Part III 
examines the standard solutions to the tragedy of the commons—top-down 
regulation and privatization—and explains how both approaches fail on the 
supranational level. I then propose a solution to the tragedy of the commons 
on the international level—the Commons Management Fund. Part IV 
explains the theoretical underpinnings of the proposal, how the approach 
differs from standard compliance mechanisms employed in treaties, and 
how, given the peculiar dynamics of multilateral environmental agreements, 
the model is uniquely crafted to diffuse a tragedy of the commons. Part V 
concludes. 
II.  THE PROBLEM UNPACKED: THE TRAGEDY IN THE TRAGEDY 
OF THE COMMONS 
A.  Hardin’s Hungry Cattle 
In a tragedy of the commons, agents’ inability to reliably coordinate 
gives rise to a social dilemma with grossly inefficient outcomes.9 The 
 
 8.  The term ‘global commons’ traditionally describes international and supranational resource 
domains, such as Antarctica, the world’s oceans and seabed, the atmosphere and space. See, e.g., SUSAN 
J. BUCK, THE GLOBAL COMMONS: AN INTRODUCTION 1 (2012). I use the term here and throughout the 
discussion, however, more loosely to refer to any common-pool resource that necessitates the collective 
action of two or more states.  
 9.  The definition of a social dilemma is any situation in which “the reward or payoff to each 
individual for a selfish choice is higher than that for a cooperative one, regardless of what other people 
do; yet all individuals in the group receive a lower payoff if all defect than if all cooperate.” FODDY, ET 
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tragedy of the commons, also referred to as the common-pool resource 
problem,10 is particularly pernicious in situations in which there is no 
centralized enforcement, and thus the stakeholders’ ability to diffuse the 
dilemma is severely impoverished. Even where it is in the collective interests 
of all parties to coordinate, each party, driven by rational self-interest, will 
generate a behavioral equilibrium that is, tragically, far worse for all the 
stakeholders. Economic rationality thus produces a sub-optimal use of the 
resource, often leading to complete destruction of a shared resource. 
Examples abound. The canonical example, however, is a group of farmers 
overgrazing a common range until it can no longer be grazed (this is the 
example used by Garrett Hardin in his famous essay formally describing the 
dilemma).11 Each farmer strives to maximize her personal gain by continuing 
to add additional cattle onto the grazing land. This gives rise to an externality 
problem. While each farmer gleans the full benefit of using the grazing land, 
each bears only a portion of the cost of its overuse. Collectively, however, 
the farmers bear the complete cost of the overgrazing. Private decision-
makers do not fully internalize the social benefits or costs that flow from 
their actions.12 Under these conditions, each farmer will, driven by economic 
rationality, continue to introduce additional cattle until the resource—the 
grazing land—is completely decimated.13 The expectation that other agents 
will behave in the same manner triggers a rush to exploit the resource. In a 
tragedy of the commons situation, nothing incentivizes collective action to 
avoid resource depletion.  Instead, actors have every incentive to deplete the 
resource. The tragic irony is that, even where all stakeholders wish to 
cooperate because of the threat of free riding, the entire system is nonetheless 
driven to eventual collapse. Each actor is compelled by rational self-interest 
 
AL., supra note 5, at 1–2. 
 10.  I use the terms common-pool resource problem and the tragedy of the commons 
interchangeably going forward. 
 11.  See Hardin, supra note 5, at 1244–45. Hardin, however, was not the first to recognize the 
problem; see generally H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The 
Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124 (1954); Anthony Scott, The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole Ownership, 
63 J. POL. ECON. 116 (1955). There are even earlier references to the social dilemma. See Jens Warming, 
Om ‘Grundrente’ af Fiskegrunde, NATIONALOKONOMISK TIDSSKRIFT 495 (1911), reprinted and 
translated in Peder Andersen, ‘On Rent of Fishing Grounds’: A Translation of Jens Warming’s 1911 
Article, with an Introduction, 15 HIST. POL. ECON. 391, 392–96 (1983) (discussing the problem in relation 
to open-access fisheries). Indeed, the problem can be found in the work of Aristotle. See ARISTOTLE, 
POLITICS 32–33 (n.d.), reprinted in ARISTOTLE, THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1148 (Richard 
McKeon ed. & Benjamin Jowett trans., 1941) (“[T]hat which is common to the greatest number has the 
least care bestowed upon it.”).  
 12.  See generally R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); Carl J. 
Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J.L. & ECON. 141 (1979). 
 13.  As Hardin points out, “[f]reedom in a commons brings ruin to all.” Hardin, supra note 5, at 
1244. 
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to deplete the resource to every actor’s disadvantage. The dilemma can be 
summed up concisely, if colloquially: a “get it while you can” mindset 
prevails, producing devastating consequences. 
The problem extends from the constituent nature of the good in 
question: the grazing land is rivalrous and non-excludable. That is, its use by 
one consumer prevents consumption by other consumers, and it is not 
possible to prevent people from consuming the resource. In his original 
analysis, however, Hardin failed to distinguish between common ownership 
regimes (where group members jointly hold property rights in the resource) 
and open access regimes (where no one holds property rights).14 While the 
tragedy of the commons is notorious with respect to open access regimes, 
the problem can surface in relation to any “natural or man-made resource 
system that is sufficiently large to make it costly (but not impossible) to 
exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from its use.”15 While 
a wide variety of things may be understood as the “commons,” the model is 
particularly consequential with respect to environmental issues of 
sustainability, such as clean air, forest management, non-renewable energy 
sources such as oil and coal, grazing lands, desertification, and—pertinent to 
the present discussion—water resources. 
B.  Lake Tanganyika and the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
Common resources that exist on a supranational level are particularly 
vulnerable to the tragedy of the commons. This is often the case with water 
reserves. Water has little respect for political boundaries or legal 
jurisdictions. Indeed, large bodies of water often serve as natural boundaries 
upon which political divisions are based. Consider, for example, Lake 
Tanganyika in East Africa. Lake Tanganyika is a trans-boundary water body 
divided among four countries: Tanzania, Burundi, the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, and Zambia.16 It is resource rich. Lake Tanganyika is the third 
largest freshwater lake in the world by volume and the second deepest.17 The 
lake provides up to forty-percent of the protein in the diets of one million 
people living in the lake basin18 and is a critical source of food, income, 
water, and transport to approximately ten million people—a population 
 
 14.  See Ellickson, supra note 6, at 1381 (“All analysts now agree that it is important to distinguish, 
as Hardin did not, between open-access territories that anyone may enter and tracts that are accessible 
only to the members of a limited populace and their licensees.”). 
 15.  OSTROM, supra note 6, at 30. 
 16.  THOMAS M. LEONARD, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE DEVELOPING WORLD 499 (2013). 
 17.  MYRON ECHENBERG, AFRICA IN THE TIME OF CHOLERA: A HISTORY OF PANDEMICS FROM 
1817 TO THE PRESENT 128 (2011). 
 18.  Id. 
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roughly twice the size of Norway.19 Lake Tanganyika, however, is now 
facing profound resource decimation due to extensive overfishing, oil and 
mineral exploration, excessive soil erosion, industrial and urban pollution, 
and intensive fishing with unsuitable methods.20 Owing to the supranational 
character of the resource, conservation efforts are proving largely 
ineffective. As the resource is further depleted, the pace of overexploitation 
is accelerating as its users compete for dwindling remains. Lake Tanganyika 
is witnessing a tragedy of the commons on a massive, transnational scale—
one that the stakeholders are powerless to prevent. 
The tragedy of the commons is captured formally in game theory as a 
multi-player prisoner’s dilemma. As the number of stakeholders increases, 
the predicament worsens because the threat of free riding looms ever larger. 
The dynamic becomes even more unstable in a multi-person prisoner’s 
dilemma:21 suspicion of just one defector can cause cooperation to 
completely unravel because  no party wishes to be the ‘sucker.’ However, 
even in the case of just two players, the dilemma emerges. 
Figure 1. Below is the tragedy of the commons modeled as a two-
person prisoner’s dilemma involving Tanzania and the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (“DRC”), two of the four states that share access to Lake 
Tanganyika. 
 
 19.  ANDREW HUDSON, UNITED NATIONS DEV. FUND, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL FINANCE,  
INTERNATIONAL WATERS PROGRAMME 16 (2009). 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  That is, games that involve more than two players—‘N-person prisoner’s dilemmas’ as they 
are termed. For a more detailed discussion of such games, see RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 
169 (1982). 
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Figure 1 models the dilemma facing Lake Tanganyika as a two-person 
prisoner’s dilemma. In the game matrix, the players are Tanzania and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (“DRC”). The states can choose either to 
conserve or not to conserve the waters of Lake Tanganyika (cooperate or not 
cooperate). If Tanzania and the DRC both choose to conserve, both players 
will receive three points—a good outcome (in that it is a sustainable one). 
However, if either party chooses to cooperate while the other party does not, 
the result will be disastrous for the cooperating party. The non-cooperating 
party will receive five points, but the cooperating party will receive zero 
points. This creates a powerful temptation for both Tanzania and the DRC to 
not cooperate in that they can gain greater advantage by doing so. However, 
because this logic holds for both the DRC and Tanzania, and this is known 
to both governments, both countries fear that the other party will free ride, 
thus rendering noncooperation the dominant strategy. While cooperating (i.e. 
conservation) provides mutual benefit regardless of the other player’s 
actions, the selfish choice of noncooperation is always the smartest move.22 
If the other player does not betray you, you gain the most by betraying them; 
if the other player does betray you, then you can mitigate this by also 
betraying them. Either way, noncooperation is the dominant strategy, 
producing the worst possible outcome for both Tanzania and the DRC—both 
states receive only one point (the eventual depletion of the resource). The 
sinister element of the prisoner’s dilemma is that the player’s logic is their 
own worst enemy because it drives them to the worst possible outcome. 
Although conserving the resource is in both countries’ long-term interests, 
each country doubts that the other party has sufficiently long time horizons 
to stick to its obligations. The tragedy is that the initial good-faith intentions 
of Tanzania and the DRC are irrelevant: the countries are driven to deplete 
the resource. Even where both parties wish to cooperate, by the diktat of 
rationality, they cannot.23 The situation devolves into a race to betray the 
other person first—a race to the bottom.24 
 
 22.  Robert Axelrod & William D. Hamilton, The Evolution of Cooperation, 211 SCI. 1390, 1391 
(1981) (“[T]wo individuals can each either cooperate or defect . . . No matter what the other does, the 
selfish choice of defection yields a higher payoff than cooperation.”). 
 23.  Much of this explanation of the prisoner’s dilemma draws from an earlier description of the 
prisoner’s dilemma I provide elsewhere. See Bryan Druzin, Opening the Machinery of Private Order: 
Public International Law as a Form of Private Ordering, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 423, 432–33 (2014). 
 24.  As Axelrod and Hamilton write, “[W]ith two individuals destined never to meet again, the only 
strategy that can be called a solution to the game is to defect always despite the seemingly paradoxical 
outcome that both do worse than they could have had they cooperated.” Axelrod & Hamilton, supra note 
22, at 1391. 
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C.  Why the Dilemma is Uniquely Pernicious on the Supranational Level 
In the quagmire of a prisoner’s dilemma, even angels are forced to 
become devils. The situation is such that it compels the parties to cheat for 
fear of being the ‘sucker.’25 They cannot trust one another and so, in their 
attempt to win, both parties lose. The prisoner’s dilemma is a formidable 
obstacle to cooperation in situations lacking third-party enforcement. The 
ever-present specter of the other side cheating undermines governance 
structures. Without external enforcement mechanisms, it is difficult for the 
parties to trust one another and, as a result, cooperative structures typically 
collapse. The lack of trust underlying the prisoner’s dilemma is easily 
resolved with third-party enforcement. The guarantee of sanctions for non-
compliance instills a sufficient degree of confidence in all players that their 
fellow-players will ‘play nice.’ Because sanctions for cheating negate any 
short-term advantage a player may glean from defection, “trust” is created, 
and the prisoner’s dilemma is solved. However, in situations lacking third-
party enforcement where there are no clear sanctions for non-compliance, 
alternative mechanisms are required to solve the prisoner’s dilemma. In such 
situations, the dilemma is far more robust and difficult to forestall. 
The common-pool resource problem is uniquely pernicious on the 
supranational level, because no centralized coercive authority exists to instill 
confidence between stakeholders and prevent a downward spiral into 
noncooperation. The problem is by no means exclusive to water.  The term 
global commons refers to any commons lying beyond the political and legal 
reach of any one state. These are natural resources upon which the fates of 
billions of people—if not of all humanity—depends. Examples include the 
global climate system, the ozone shield, Antarctica, the deep seabed minerals 
of the world’s oceans, and the atmosphere.26 These resources are non-
renewable on human timescales. Traditionally, these resources remained 
untouched by legal jurisdiction because accessing them was not 
technologically cost-effective, and the value of the resource was insufficient 
to justify acquisition efforts.27 Yet as technology grows more sophisticated 
and populations balloon, this economic calculation is changing. As the 
environmental impact of our behavior as a species becomes clearer, the need 
 
 25.  The Prisoner’s Dilemma dynamic is in fact the reason that plea bargaining is forbidden in many 
jurisdictions, as it can potentially compel innocent parties to confess to crimes they did not commit. For 
a good discussion of this, see generally Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, The Prisoners’ (Plea Bargain) 
Dilemma, 1 J. LEGAL ANAL. 737 (2009). 
 26.  See MICHAEL GOLDMAN, PRIVATIZING NATURE: POLITICAL STRUGGLES FOR THE GLOBAL 
COMMONS IX–X (1998); ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: PROTECTING THE 
ENVIRONMENT IN A STATELESS SOCIETY 20 (1994). 
 27.  See BUCK, supra note 8, at 1 (noting that the technological ability to exploit these resources 
“has now caught up with desire”). 
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to prevent a tragedy of a commons from emerging on a supranational level 
is assuming a degree of alarming urgency. Management of the global 
commons requires international and supranational legal regimes capable of 
sustaining compliance in the face of mutual distrust. 
III.  REGULATION, PRIVATIZATION, AND THE PROPOSED 
SOLUTION 
The tragedy of the commons can be conceptualized as a form of market 
failure. Where there are externalities—specifically, where “some of the costs 
(or benefits) of an activity are not borne by the decision maker engaging in 
that activity—the market will fail to produce an optimal result.”28 The market 
will produce either overproduction (where the cost is not completely borne 
by the actor) or underproduction (where the benefit is not completely borne 
by the actor).29 In a common resource problem, external costs are not borne 
entirely by the decision maker. As such, overproduction ensues, typically 
leading to resource depletion. The received wisdom of welfare economics 
offers two potential solutions to the tragedy of the commons: top-down 
regulation or privatization.30 A third approach, what we may call voluntary 
small group cooperation, has been explored by the political economist Elinor 
Ostrom (for which she won a Nobel prize).31 As Ostrom demonstrated, rules 
and institutions can emerge within close-knit communities to ensure shared 
management of resources.32 Ostrom’s approach, however, is simply not 
viable on the international level. By definition, it does not pertain to global 
actors. The international community is the antithesis of a close-knit 
community able to develop strong norms of conservation.33 The present 
discussion, therefore, focuses exclusively on the first two approaches—top-
down regulation and privatization. However, these two approaches do not 
fare any better when transposed onto the transnational level of decentralized 
governance. As we will see, both the regulatory and privatization approaches 
face significant challenges with respect to global commons. 
 
 28.  Sinden, supra note 4, at 545; see also TOM TIETENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL 
RESOURCE ECONOMICS 51–54 (1992). 
 29.  Sinden, supra note 4, at 545.  
 30.  See id. at 535. However, it should be noted that where conditions allow for it, “common 
ownership regimes . . . offer a third way out of the tragedy that resists categorization as either a 
government regulation or a private property/market regime.” Id. at 548.  
 31.  See OSTROM, supra note 6 (arguing that common-pool problems may be solved by voluntary 
organizations rather than by a coercive state or privatization). 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Although, given a sufficiently high degree of repeated interaction, it is not inconceivable that 
the international community may demonstrate some of the traits of a small community.  
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A.  The Regulatory Approach 
Most mainstream neo-classical and Keynesian economists believe 
regulatory intervention is needed to correct market inefficiencies.34 As 
applied to the commons, we may call this tack the regulatory approach. The 
regulatory approach takes a variety of forms. However, attempts to regulate 
our way out of the tragedy of the commons generally fall into two broad 
camps. The first is command and control regulation, where an administrative 
authority directs the behavior of private parties—for instance, legislation 
requiring private vehicles to pass an emissions test or requiring homeowners 
to install energy-saving light bulbs.35 The second method is arguably less 
intrusive and relies on the creation of economic incentives. Examples of this 
approach include pollution taxes and environmental trading markets 
(“ETMs”).36 One popular example of an ETM is the introduction of tradable 
carbon emission permits to control pollution patterns (commonly known as 
“cap-and-trade”). Cap-and-trade can be understood as a light-touch, market-
based form of regulation. It artificially creates a market, but then steps back 
and allows the market to self-order in relation to larger market forces. While 
many place ETMs squarely on the privatization side of the ledger, the 
approach is more properly conceptualized as a regulatory solution—it is not 
privatization in its most pure sense.37 
Classic examples of the command and control approach are anti-
poaching laws and whaling bans. In both cases, the actions of private parties 
are directly controlled by the force of law and the threat of sanctions. In 
certain instances, light-touch forms of top-down regulation are employed in 
lieu of outright bans. The creation of hunting seasons is a good example. 
Similar forms of regulatory tack can be seen in the case of logging where 
denuding is restricted in designated areas and allowed to resume after a fixed 
number of years in order to avoid permanent deforestation. A more familiar 
example of the regulatory approach is the regulation of open-water fishing 
to prevent depletion of fishing stock. A common regulatory strategy is to 
 
 34.  See GREGORY N. MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MACROECONOMICS 11–12 (2009) (discussing 
market failure). But see the concept of “government failure.” For a fantastic overview of the concept, see 
generally GORDON TULLOCK, ET AL., GOVERNMENT FAILURE: A PRIMER IN PUBLIC CHOICE (2002). 
 35.  An example of such a scheme is the recently defunct “AirCare” vehicle emissions testing 
program in the province of British Columbia, Canada.  
 36.  See Sinden, supra note 4, at 549 (arguing that environmental trading markets should be 
conceptualized as merely a more minimalist form of regulation in that even with respect to ETMs, an 
administrator still decides where to set the cap on overall resource use). 
 37.  See id. at 549–55; see also Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental 
Regulation, 54 DUKE L.J. 795, 819–20 (2005);. see generally David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an 
Economic Incentive Program?: Replacing the Command and Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 289 (1998). 
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impose quotas that limit species-specific total catch within a given fishery. 
Licensing schemes and regulations that prohibit certain kinds of nets, mesh 
sizes, or place limits on fish traps are also commonly employed. In some 
cases, the threat of the tragedy of the commons is so pernicious that 
exceedingly invasive regulation may be imposed. China provided the 
ultimate example of such an approach. The country’s one-child policy, 
which constrained reproductive freedom for “the common good,” was an 
effort to prevent the emergence of a tragedy of commons on a truly massive 
scale by directly limiting potential users of the commons.38 Indeed, 
population control was precisely the solution that Hardin proposed to solve 
the tragedy of the commons.39 
While the regulatory approach may solve the dilemma, it is difficult to 
implement on the supranational level. The problem is that the global 
community is a polycentric mosaic of legal authorities lacking a centralized 
authority with coercive strength. International administrative law is nascent 
at best and the legal complexity of regulating waterways, lakes, and oceans 
that span multiple jurisdictions is enormous.40 With respect to global 
commons, the only recourse is international agreements in the form of 
environmental treaties and protocols. The international community only 
began to recognize in earnest the magnitude of transnational environmental 
challenges during the 1960s,41 with international environmental agreements 
proliferating significantly following the 1972 Stockholm Intergovernmental 
Conference (The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment).42 
Such understandings are, in the words of Hardin, “mutual coercion, mutually 
agreed upon.”43 However, the ability of such agreements to successfully 
address the tragedy of the commons on a supranational level remains 
troublingly deficient, as was so patently illustrated by the failure of the Kyoto 
Protocol.44 Moreover, international environmental agreements remain 
 
 38.  China began to formally phase out its one-child policy beginning in 2015. See Chris Buckley, 
China Ends One-Child Policy, Allowing Families Two Children, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2015), 
http://nyti.ms/1kVjncp [https://perma.cc/G8AJ-JZVF];. see generally ESTHER GOH, CHINA’S ONE-CHILD 
POLICY AND MULTIPLE CAREGIVING: RAISING LITTLE SUNS IN XIAMEN (2011) (examining the 
sociological impact of China’s one child policy). 
 39.  See Hardin, supra note 5. 
 40.  See William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 
89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 25 (2003–2004). 
 41.  PETER M. HAAS ET AL., INSTITUTIONS FOR THE EARTH: SOURCES OF EFFECTIVE 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 6 (1993). 
 42.  Michael Zürn, The Rise of International Environmental Politics: A Review of Current Research, 
50 WORLD POL. 617, 623 (1998). 
 43.  Buzbee, supra note 40, at 19. 
 44.  For a good examination of why the Kyoto Protocol failed, see generally GERALD KUTNEY, 
CARBON POLITICS AND THE FAILURE OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL (2014) (detailing the political evolution 
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insufficient in number to adequately address the ecological challenges we 
face. With respect to water management, there are 263 transboundary water 
basins globally; however, only 158 of these possess any cooperative 
management framework.45 There is no coherent legal regime in place to 
manage water resources.46 The international governance that does exist is 
based upon a disjointed patchwork of environmental treaties that are highly 
susceptible to collapse.47 Again, it should be borne in mind that this problem 
applies to environmental governance more broadly and is not restricted 
merely to conservation of global water commons. 
B.  The Privatization Approach 
While many theorists advocate the regulatory approach in response to 
the tragedy of the commons, others fiercely debate the necessity (and 
effectiveness) of this approach, pointing to the dangers implicit in regulation. 
These voices argue that privatization is a more efficient, effective, and 
elegant solution to the problem.48 We may term this approach the 
privatization approach. Since the close of the last century and the defeat of 
communism at the hands of free market capitalism, the privatization 
approach has gained increasing intellectual ascendency—particularly in the 
United States—where the market has “all but swept away command and 
control as a device for managing resources.”49 There has been a rise in “free-
market environmentalism,” which holds that the enforcement of private 
 
of Kyoto Protocol negotiations and examining its subsequent failure).  
 45.  UNESCO, THE UNITED NATIONS WORLD WATER DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2015: WATER FOR 
A SUSTAINABLE WORLD 11 (2015). 
 46.  MATTHEW ZENTNER, DESIGN AND IMPACT OF WATER TREATIES: MANAGING CLIMATE 
CHANGE 2 (2012) (“The closest to a universal mechanism is the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention. . . 
.”). The UN Watercourses Convention (UNWC) articulates a global legal framework that “establishes 
basic standards and rules for cooperation between watercourse states on the use, management, and 
protection of international watercourses.” FLAVIA LOURES, ET AL., EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW 
ABOUT THE U.N. WATERCOURSES CONVENTION 1 (2014). However, the UNWC only entered into force 
in August 2014 and is limited in scope. It does not provide a meaningful basis for comprehensive water 
management. Indeed, the UNWC has been criticized as largely failing to advance sustainable water use 
or regulate the discretionary powers of riparian states. See PHILIPPE CULLET, ET AL., WATER LAW FOR 
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF WATER LAW REFORM IN 
INDIA 38–40 (2009). 
 47.  These mostly come in the form of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), such as the 
Kyoto Protocol. 
 48.  With reference to the tragedy of the commons, see generally, e.g.,, Robert Smith, Resolving the 
Tragedy of the Commons by Creating Private Property Rights in Wildlife, 1 CATO J. 439 (1981). 
Important here is the famed Coase theorem and the idea of private ordering through market forces (where 
transaction costs are zero); see generally R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 
(1960); R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).  
 49.  Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission 
Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 130 (1998–99). 
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property rights within the free market is sufficient to solve the common 
resource problem.50 Common examples of privatization are water markets,51 
transferable fishing quotas, and carbon emission trading schemes.52 
Although the privatization approach may take a variety of forms, the basic 
premise is as follows: converting non-property into private property forces 
resource owners to internalize the costs of overexploitation thereby creating 
an incentive to preserve the resource.53 The heart of the problem is that 
without some kind of property rights regime, a valuable open-access 
resource will invariably be overexploited. If a resource is privatized, the 
argument goes, the resource owner’s “private cost-benefit analysis would 
yield a result that was optimal for society as well as for her. All externalities 
would be internalized and the tragedy of the commons would be solved.”54 
Privatization solves the problem without the need for top-down regulation 
because decision makers bear the full costs and benefits of their actions. The 
privatization approach is the second solution Hardin discusses, suggesting 
that the commons may be sold off as private property.55 
The privatization approach, however, has not proven workable on the 
supranational level. Three central problems emerge (from among many). The 
first is normative. The second relates to actors’ time horizons with respect to 
the resource, and the third concerns the profound logistical challenges of 
privatizing commons on a supranational level. Let us examine each of these 
in turn. 
1.  Normative Issues 
First, on a basic visceral level, the privatization of water resources is a 
radical concept fraught with normative challenges. All living things depend 
upon water for their very existence. The proposition that something so 
essential to human survival, such as access to water, should be parceled up 
and privatized, perhaps allowing for monopoly control of the resource, may 
give many profound caution. Indeed, “[u]nlike almost every other form of 
property, which we allow to be entirely privatized, water has always been 
viewed as something in which the community has a stake and which no one 
 
 50.  See, e.g., TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM 27–
35 (2001). 
 51.  This is also known as ‘water trading’—the buying and selling of water access entitlements. The 
concept is similar in function to ETMs. 
 52.  Sinden, supra note 4, at 537–38. The extent that this can be conceptualized as privatization is, 
however, debatable.  
 53.  Daniel H. Cole, Clearing the Air: Four Propositions about Property Rights and Environmental 
Protection, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 103, 106 (1999–2000). 
 54.  Sinden, supra note 4, at 556. 
 55.  Hardin, supra note 5, at 1245. 
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can fully own.”56 For example, the poor may be priced out of the resource 
and underprivileged communities may be bypassed altogether in terms of 
access to the resource.57 Because water quality is not readily detectable by 
end-users, a privatized market will create incentives to provide the minimum 
quality of water in order to maximize profits. Additionally, private water 
sectors may engage in political bargaining to block environmental 
conservation efforts, giving rise to the danger of regulatory capture on the 
domestic level. Yet there are other even more serious concerns. Should a 
privatized water market become non-competitive with a few key players or 
a single player dominating the global market, the ability to manipulate the 
price of such a precious resource could produce catastrophic consequences 
of a truly dystopian quality. The power of a global ‘water cartel’ would dwarf 
that of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and 
its influence over world oil prices. The implications of such a concentration 
of power are a very serious cause for concern. Yet, normative reservations 
aside, there are other, more technical problems to the privatization approach. 
2.  No Guarantee of Long Time Horizons 
A core problem with privatization is that it may not necessarily yield an 
equilibrium that promotes conservation. The core assumption of the 
privatization approach is that the market will provide incentives to adopt a 
long-term view—a view that government administrators, whose time 
horizons often stretch no further than their next career move, may lack.58 A 
private owner will have the low discount rate and long time horizon 
necessary to conserve a resource. There are, however, several problems with 
this assumption—indeed it is not nearly as airtight as many free market 
environmentalists would have us believe. If private owner’s time horizons 
collapse, so too will the resource. There is empirical work that challenges 
this supposition. For instance, a study of the economics of whaling shows 
that the “extermination of the entire [whale] population may appear as the 
most attractive policy, even to an individual resource owner,” where “(a) the 
discount (or time preference) rate sufficiently exceeds the maximum 
reproductive potential of the population, and (b) an immediate profit can be 
 
 56.  Joseph L. Sax, Understanding Transfers: Community Rights and the Privatization of Water, 1 
W.N.W. 13, 13 (1994). 
 57.  See SHARON BEDER, ENVIRONMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY 
INTRODUCTION 143–45 (2006) (discussing how free-market environmentalism can reinforce existing 
inequalities).  
 58.  Cole, supra note 53, at 122. See, e.g., Richard L. Stroup & Sandra L. Goodman, Property 
Rights, Environmental Resources, and the Future, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 427, 431–32 (1992) 
(arguing that the “ability to capitalize future value into an asset’s present value induces property owners 
to consider the long-term implications of their asset-use decisions”). 
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made from harvesting the last remaining animals . . . .”59 As another example, 
the pressure of market competition combined with ignorance of dryland 
farming methods drove private farmers in the 1930s to engage in deep 
plowing of the virgin topsoil of the United States’ Great Plains, eventually 
causing the environmental catastrophe of the Dust Bowl.60 
Indeed, many commentators have pointed out that “claims that 
‘privatization’ is a necessary and sufficient condition for optimal 
environmental protection are inherently implausible, under-supported by 
economic theory, and under-determined by the available empirical 
evidence.”61 There is no guarantee that private resource owners will always 
possess sufficiently high time horizons. For instance, uncertainty regarding 
the future value of a resource may drive private owners to overexploit the 
resource while prices are high. What would be the fate of the world’s 
petroleum reserves if a new energy source capable of wholly replacing the 
world’s dependency on oil suddenly became imminent? What would happen 
to the pace of logging if a technological substitute for all uses of timber 
suddenly appeared on the near horizon? Moreover, the problem of high 
discount rates may be particularly pernicious if the resource owner is a public 
company with a fiduciary duty to maximize annual profits for short-term 
investors who may not “be in it for the long haul.” 
3.  Logistical Challenges 
Perhaps the most fundamental problem with the privatization approach 
on the supranational level, however, is that it is often logistically impossible 
to divide up and privatize a commons. This is particularly true in the case of 
water. Supranational water reserves cannot be privatized. Water flows freely 
across multiple jurisdictions, making it impossible to parcel it off under 
private ownership. Indeed, water “is a resource that is hard to pin down 
within fixed property boundaries and is, thus, particularly vulnerable to the 
tragedy of the commons.”62 The physical dimensions of Lake Tanganyika, 
for instance, cannot be effectively privatized by creating property 
boundaries. This difficulty is even more salient with respect to the world’s 
international waterways, seas, and oceans that do not fall under any 
 
 59.  Colin W. Clark, Profit Maximization and the Extinction of Animal Species, 81 J. POL. ECON. 
950, 950–51 (1973); see also Colin W. Clark, The Economics of Overexploitation, 181 SCI. 630, 630 
(1973); Edella Schlager & Elinor Ostrom, Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A 
Conceptual Analysis, 68 LAND ECON. 249, 256 (1992). 
 60.  DANIEL W. BROMLEY, ENVIRONMENT AND ECONOMY: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND PUBLIC 
POLICY 171 (1991). See generally DONALD WORSTER, DUST BOWL: THE SOUTHERN PLAINS IN THE 
1930S (2004). 
 61.  Cole, supra note 53, at 105.  
 62.  Sinden, supra note 4, at 576. 
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jurisdiction. The problem is that water “flows across boundaries, seeps under 
the earth, evaporates into the air, and fluctuates drastically in quantity 
depending on random and unpredictable weather patterns. As such, water is 
not amenable to the imposition of full ownership rights in the nature of a fee 
simple interest in land.”63  While some free market environmentalists have 
actually proposed that we privatize the ocean, or at least portions of it, 
arguing that the ocean floor may be allocated to private property owners,64 
there remain insurmountable logistical hurdles to such an approach.65 
Unlike land, the resources of value found in water—like the water 
itself—are not tethered to the ocean floor, but rather are suspended in the 
water and flow freely around.66 Indeed, Hardin pointed out that privatization 
may often be impossible to implement given that certain commons, such as 
the earth’s air and water, are logistically impossible to privatize: “the air and 
waters surrounding us cannot readily be fenced, and so the tragedy of the 
commons as a cesspool must be prevented by different means. . . .”67 
Hardin’s solution lies in administrative law.68 The non-fixed nature of water 
resources renders effective privatization of large-scale water reserves (or 
even small-scale) impracticable. Large bodies of water typically consist of a 
myriad of sweeping complex and overlapping ecosystems.69 
Related to this is the problem of what we may call “leaky externalities.” 
The precise meaning of externalities is difficult to pinpoint—it is difficult 
even to delineate what precisely a “commons” is in that the environment is 
so interconnected. As such, it is unclear what exactly should be privatized. 
The idea that we can parcel off discrete sections of the environment exposes 
a profound ignorance of how interconnected the natural environment 
actually is. The privatization approach becomes ever more difficult to accept 
on a conceptual level as “we become increasingly aware of the vast web of 
connections that link species and ecosystems to each other . . . and the extent 
to which human activities that disrupt ecosystems can have ripple effects that 
extend over vast areas. . . .”70 The problem of “leaky externalities” also 
 
 63.  Id. at 578. 
 64.  See, e.g., Walter Block, Environmental Problems, Private Property Rights Solutions, in 
ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A RECONCILIATION 281, 292–93 (Walter Block ed., 1990); 
ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 50, at 116. 
 65.  Although, some argue that technology may eventually render such an approach feasible. See, 
e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Legal Obstacles to Private Ordering in Marine Fisheries, 8 ROGER WILLIAMS 
U. L. REV. 9, 21 (2002).  
 66.  Sinden, supra note 4, at 601. 
 67.  Hardin, supra note 5, at 1245. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Sinden, supra note 4, at 601. 
 70.  Id. at 588. 
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applies to the regulatory approach, but it is particularly relevant to 
privatization because of the need to clearly divide the commons between an 
array of private actors. 
While the privatization approach may be an effective tool to promote 
conservation and prevent the tragedy of the commons in some situations, this 
is not always the case. It is particularly difficult to implement on the 
supranational level. On the supranational level, the privatization approach 
fares no better than the regulatory approach (and it arguably fares worse). 
The key problem remains: how can the tragedy of the commons be diffused 
in situations of decentralized governance where actors do not answer to an 
overarching authority? Privatization does not change this equation in any 
way. While regulating or privatizing our way out of the dilemma represents 
divergent solutions to the problem, the two approaches are the same in the 
sense that they both rely ultimately on enforcement. In the case of the 
regulatory approach, this is obvious: regulation requires the enforcement of 
sanctions for plundering the commons. With respect to privatization, the 
need for enforcement may be less obvious, but no less true. Privatization 
requires an overarching legal authority to enforce private property rights. 
With either approach, we eventually return to the same problem—in a 
transnational, decentralized governance situation, there is no authority 
capable of enforcing the rules of the game. Thus, the challenge before us is 
to devise a solution that can produce stable coordination in the absence of 
such an authority. 
 
C.  The Proposed Solution: The Commons Management Fund 
In light of these deficiencies, this discussion proposes a solution. The 
idea—the Commons Management Fund deposit scheme (“CMF”)—would 
work as follows: states joining (or already party to) an agreement would 
contribute an upfront “deposit” to an international regulatory body with the 
understanding that all or part of their contribution will be forfeited if they 
fail to honor their treaty commitments. The goal of the scheme, however, is 
not to remedy particular instances of non-compliance; rather—and this is an 
important point—it is to produce a sufficient degree of initial confidence in 
other parties’ level of commitment so as to prevent a tragedy of the commons 
from emerging. The working assumption here is that states want to comply—
this is the reason why states enter into environmental agreements in the first 
place. The problem is simply one of trust. The CMF is designed to build 
trust. 
The CMF would be an international regulatory body that could be 
established under the auspices of the United Nations (the “UNCMF”). The 
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CMF would comprise the deposit scheme but would also consist of the 
institutional structures required to implement and oversee the system. Any 
group of states could register a treaty (e.g., the Paris Agreement) with the 
CMF, and their combined deposits would be held in reserve.71 This deposit 
would have to be large—very large. The deposit with accrued interest would 
be returned to member states after a specified period of time (i.e., the 
conclusion of the treaty. For minor infractions, a deduction could be made 
from a state’s deposit. For major breaches, the entire deposit may be forfeited 
(under one variant of the model, a state’s deposit would be distributed to one 
or more other parties in order to incentivize monitoring).72 The CMF would 
include a regulatory body that would be charged with investigating alleged 
breaches. To accommodate potential wealth disparities between states, a 
percentage-based variant of the deposit scheme based on Gross Domestic 
Product (“GDP”), or other relevant metrics, could be designed. A 
percentage-based deposit would maintain its efficacy in that it would signal 
the same degree of commitment (building trust). Such a scheme would have 
the benefit of remaining financially accessible to all states regardless of the 
size of their economies. The extent of the deposit necessary to signal states’ 
commitment and build sufficient trust could be left to the determination of 
the parties themselves—the parties are best positioned to understand how 
strong of a commitment is required. We can be confident that they will do so 
because in a tragedy of the commons, the stakeholders are typically acting 
in good faith—the problem is merely that the fear of defection by other 
parties drives all parties to defect. 
The CMF is a governance mechanism available to governments to 
strengthen their ability to coordinate through signaling commitment (a 
detailed exposition of the theory that underlies this is discussed in the 
following section). Some readers may feel the proposal is unrealistic because 
governments would be reluctant to provide such large deposits. What should 
be appreciated, however, is that any level of deposit will boost the signaling 
ability of the parties—anything is better than nothing, and the higher the 
deposit, the stronger the signal. Moreover, the CMF would provide an 
invaluable separating equilibrium. A state’s hesitation to contribute the funds 
necessary to administer the CMF would clearly signal to other governments 
that state’s lack of genuine commitment to the agreement. 
 
 71.  The CMF need not be limited to merely environmental agreements. However, the focus here is 
upon the tragedy of the commons, a problem that manifests quite starkly with respect to the conservation 
of common-pool resources.  
 72.  The idea of using the forfeited sums to incentivize whistleblowing was suggested to me by Prof. 
Bryan Mercurio. 
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While the CMF model can be understood as falling on the regulatory 
side of the ledger, it is not top-down regulation—it is bottom-up regulation, 
self-imposed by parties trapped in a tragedy of the commons. This distinction 
is crucial because this bottom-up character allows the CMF to function on a 
supranational level. Indeed, because the current global order operates in a 
technical state of anarchy, there is no other choice but for enforcement to 
unfold in a bottom-up fashion. The model is deceptively complex. It may not 
be immediately apparent, however, given the peculiar dynamics of 
multilateral environmental agreements, as will be shown, the CMF is 
uniquely crafted to diffuse a tragedy of the commons. To appreciate why this 
is the case, a structural understanding of how multilateral environmental 
agreements typically unravel and the limitations of conventional 
enforcement mechanisms is required. 
IV.  HOW THE CMF DIFFERS FROM TRADITIONAL COMPLIANCE 
MECHANISMS 
The tragedy of the commons is a unique dynamic that calls for a unique 
solution. The CMF concept is simple; however, its theoretical underpinnings 
are complex. Let us unpack this, paying special attention to the unique 
character of multilateral environmental agreements, and, in particular, how 
such agreements typically fail. 
A.  The Inherent ‘Tippiness’ of Multilateral Environmental Agreements 
The vast majority of treaties in fact do not possess robust external 
enforcement mechanisms.73 Nevertheless, there is a growing interest in 
employing compliance mechanisms in multilateral environmental 
agreements (“MEAs”) as a means to encourage compliance.74 Compliance 
 
 73.  Beth Simmons, Treaty Compliance and Violation, 13 ANNU. REV. POLIT. SCI. 273, 277 (2010). 
Enforcement mechanisms have been well-studied in theories of treaty compliance. This literature is large; 
however, there are prominent theorists. See generally, e.g., MARKUS  BURGSTALLER, THEORIES OF 
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005) (providing a comprehensive analysis of theories of 
compliance); EDITH BROWN WEISS & HAROLD KARAN JACOBSON, ENGAGING COUNTRIES: 
STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS (2000) (presenting a 
systematic examination of implementation and compliance with international environmental accords); 
Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997) (presenting 
a compliance theory predicated on vertical interaction between private and public actors); ABRAM 
CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL 
REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1998) (proposing a managerial approach and arguing that coercion is not 
the primary instrument of compliance). 
 74.  Nils Goeteyn & Frank Maes, Compliance Mechanisms in Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements: An Effective Way to Improve Compliance?, 10 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 791, 791 (2011). 
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mechanisms may be positive75 or negative—carrot or stick in nature.76 With 
respect to negative enforcement mechanisms, four main types of penalties 
can be discerned. These are: warnings; suspension of privileges; trade 
sanctions; and liability.77 Each represents an escalation in severity.78 A 
warning—the least severe penalty—indicates that stronger penalties are 
forthcoming if the actor does not change its behavior.79 Some MEAs provide 
for a suspension of privileges whereby certain rights under the agreement are 
denied to the non-compliant party—for example, participation in voting or 
various committees.80 The threat of trade sanctions may be effective; parties 
deemed non-compliant may incur substantial economic (and even political) 
costs.81 Non-compliant parties may be required to offer compensation, often 
in the form of financial reparations for the damage caused by their 
misbehavior.82 
While these penalties can exert substantial compliance pressure in 
international treaties, negative enforcement mechanisms of this nature do not 
always map well onto agreements involving a tragedy of the commons 
dynamic. The problem is that, because such agreements rest so much on 
expectations, coordination under governance regimes that involve a tragedy 
of the commons dynamic can be exceedingly fragile and thus easily 
undermined by such penalties. Such agreements are susceptible to collapse, 
which may be triggered by even trivial defections. The problem resides in 
the unique nature of MEAs—the value of an MEA is largely tied to the 
number of actors adhering to the agreement. An agreement to reduce carbon 
emissions between only two states, for example, provides little value. Not 
only does such an agreement achieve little in terms of actually reducing 
global carbon emissions, more crucially for our purposes, the two states will 
be highly reluctant to assume the burden of curbing their emissions while the 
 
 75.  Indeed, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has provided guidelines that set 
out an assortment of techniques to facilitate compliance in MEAs, ranging from financial and technical 
assistance to capacity building and technology transfer. See generally UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT 
PROGRAMME, MANUAL ON COMPLIANCE WITH AND ENFORCEMENT OF MULTILATERAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS (2006) for a fuller discussion. 
 76.  ULRICH BEYERLIN, PETER-TOBIAS STOLL & RÜDIGER WOLFRUM, ENSURING COMPLIANCE 
WITH MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: A DIALOGUE BETWEEN PRACTITIONERS AND 
ACADEMIA 306 (2006). 
 77. UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME (UNEP), COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS UNDER 
SELECTED MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS 117 (2007). 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer is an example of an 
MEA that provides such a penalty. 
 81.  See JACOB WERKSMANN, GREENING INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 102 (2014). 
 82.  UNEP, supra note 77, at 117–18. 
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remainder of the international community does nothing.  However, the value 
of the same agreement increases dramatically with twenty, ninety, or 190 
governments in hand. This is why it was so vital that the Paris Agreement 
lock down the participation of all the states of the world. A strong argument 
could be made that the Kyoto Protocol’s lack of success stemmed from its 
failure to secure an equal commitment from all the world’s states; thereby 
undermining its chances at success from its very inception.83 
An MEA’s value increases as more parties comply with the agreement, 
and the inverse is equally true: an MEA’s value decreases commensurate 
with the number of actors who either do not comply or exit the agreement 
altogether. This is a classic example of what is known in the economics 
literature as a network effect.84 The larger the network of adopters, the greater 
value the agreement provides and vice versa.85 Perceptions are 
extraordinarily consequential under such conditions. Because the value of a 
standard or product depends upon how many other actors adopt it, actors’ 
 
 83.  The developed nations of the world accepted the initial reductions called for under the Protocol 
with the developing world not included in the reductions. See generally A.W. GALSTON & CHRISTIANA 
Z. PEPPARD, EXPANDING HORIZONS IN BIOETHICS (2005). For a good general discussion of the failure of 
the Kyoto Protocol, see KUTNEY supra note 44. See also generally DAVID G. VICTOR, THE COLLAPSE OF 
THE KYOTO PROTOCOL AND THE STRUGGLE TO SLOW GLOBAL WARMING (2011) (arguing that the 
Protocol does not provide for adequate monitoring and enforcement of emissions trading). 
 84.  Network effects (also known as network externalities) emerge where the implicit value of a 
product or service increases as the number of other agents using the same product or service grows, which 
in turn draws more users. See S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis., Network Externalities, in THE NEW 
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 671, 671 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). Network 
externalities arise from the need for compatibility between standards. The classic example of a network 
effect is language. The more people who, for example, speak English, the more useful English is to each 
one of its speakers. This creates a positive externality. As more people speak English, the value of the 
language increases for everyone. For the foundational literature on network effects, see M. L. Katz & C. 
Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 424 (1985); 
see also SCOTT BARRETT, ENVIRONMENT AND STATECRAFT: THE STRATEGY OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
TREATY-MAKING 261–62 (2003) (discussing network externalities in environmental treaties). 
 85.  I have discussed network effects at length elsewhere. See, e.g., Bryan Druzin, Buying 
Commercial Law: Choice of Law, Choice of Forum, and Network Effect, 18 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
131 (2009) (arguing that network effects induce standardization in choice of law and choice of forum 
clauses in transnational commercial contracts); Bryan Druzin, Anarchy, Order, and Trade: A Structuralist 
Account of Why a Global Commercial Legal Order is Emerging, 47 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1049, 
1076–83 (2014) (arguing that network effects help standardize legal practices); Bryan Druzin, 
Spontaneous Standardization and the New Lex Maritima, in OXFORD INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
SERIES: THE CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT OF SHIPPING LAW 63, 72–73 (Miriam Goldby ed., 2016) 
(arguing that network effects manifest powerfully in shipping law as a consequence of the high level of 
natural interconnection implicit in shipping networks, and that this helps spontaneously standardize the 
legal practices of the lex maritima); Bryan Druzin, Why Does Soft Law Have Any Power Anyway? ASIAN 
J. OF INT’L L. (2016) (arguing that network effects help explain why, although lacking legal and coercive 
force, so much soft law is widely adopted and followed); Bryan Druzin, Towards a Theory of Spontaneous 
Legal Standardization, J. OF INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT (2016) (positing a theory as to how legal 
standardization may occur in a decentralized, spontaneous fashion as the result of network externalities 
and increasing returns) (forthcoming). 
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choices are largely based on the expected size of the network.86 This being 
the case, “consumer expectations may drive market outcomes such that they 
become self-fulfilling.”87 In markets exhibiting network effects (as with any 
game with multiple equilibria), expectations are key. As such, the network 
effect character of a MEA renders it uniquely vulnerable to “bandwagons.” 
A positive bandwagon of actors joining the treaty is a case of what is known 
as increasing returns. A negative bandwagon of actors abandoning the 
treaty—a sort of “jumping ship” effect—is a case of what is known as 
decreasing returns. The decreasing returns nature of MEAs makes them 
extremely ‘tippy’ and highly susceptible to collapse.88 A case could be made 
that the United States’ sudden withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol in the 
opening months of the Bush administration initiated a negative bandwagon, 
tipping the agreement towards eventual failure.89 This dynamic is not as 
salient in the case of, for example, a multilateral trade agreement (at least it 
is not the primary problem). Even if a large number of signatories exit a trade 
agreement, the agreement may still retain a significant degree of value for 
the remaining treaty members. Such agreements can thus better withstand 
the blow of one or more parties withdrawing from the agreement or cheating. 
This difference is significant because it will determine which enforcement 
mechanism is most appropriate to attenuate a tragedy of the commons. 
Traditional negative compliance mechanisms are designed to punish 
offenders. While this may work well when considered in isolation (indeed, 
it can be very effective in forcing parties to change their behavior), such 
punitive mechanisms do not apply well to treaties with the potential for 
decreasing returns (i.e. a tragedy of the commons). Negative compliance 
mechanisms can cause the collapse of a treaty, with a few defecting parties 
triggering a mass exodus from the agreement as a negative bandwagon takes 
hold. Even in the best of scenarios, such measures will significantly weaken 
an agreement’s cohesion because confidence in the commitment of other 
parties will be undermined. With a tragedy of the commons dynamic, 
perception is reality. If actors believe others will comply, they are more 
likely to comply; if actors believe others will not comply, they are less likely 
to comply. 
 
 86.  LUÍS M. B. CABRAL, INTRODUCTION TO INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 312 (2000). 
 87.  Irina Suleymanova, et al., On the Role of Consumer Expectations in Markets with Network 
Effects 2 (Dice Discussion Paper, Paper No. 13, 2010). 
 88.  For a similar analysis in this vein, see BARRETT, supra note 84, at 254–67. 
 89.  For a discussion of the U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol, see DIANNE RAHM, CLIMATE 
CHANGE POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES: THE SCIENCE, THE POLITICS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE 
77–80 (2010); MICHAEL G. FAURE, GREEN GIANTS?: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES 
AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 358–61 (2004). 
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As such, even relatively benign punitive measures against a party, such 
as a warning or a temporary suspension of privileges, signals to other parties 
that coordination has faltered. The perception that commitment to the 
agreement may be flagging may cause other parties to not comply. In this 
fashion, even a small spark can incinerate cooperation. As the severity of the 
punitive mechanisms increase, the possibility of a negative bandwagon 
effect increases. Economic sanctions or forcing a non-complying party to 
pay exacting reparations may cause the sanctioned party to simply withdraw 
from the agreement. While sanctions are typically considered essential to 
achieving compliance in trade agreements,90 withdrawal of even one party 
can destabilize a treaty exhibiting a tragedy of the commons dynamic in that 
it can trigger a negative bandwagon—causing the treaty to ‘tip’ suddenly 
towards collapse. Some treaty regimes even provide for the expulsion of non-
complying parties as a penalty.91 In a tragedy of the commons dynamic, 
treaty expulsion is highly self-defeating—expulsion of a few key members 
may lead to total treaty collapse. The unique nature of tragedy of the 
commons scenarios must be fully appreciated—i.e. the value of the 
agreement is contingent upon all the other parties also complying. The 
dynamic this produces is markedly different than those at play with respect 
to other international agreements. 
B.  The Power of Signaling 
Understanding this, it becomes clear why the CMF is well-suited to 
address a tragedy of the commons dynamic. The problem for most treaty 
types is that parties may cheat if incentive structures change, so punitive 
measures are necessary ex post (after the fact) to discourage cheating. 
However, in the case of treaties exhibiting a tragedy of the commons 
dynamic, incentive structures may remain unchanged, yet parties otherwise 
willing to honor their commitments may cheat simply due to a lack of trust. 
In a tragedy of the commons, the mere fear of others cheating induces 
cheating. Because the primary problem is one of trust, robust ex ante (before 
the fact) signaling can be particularly effective in solving the dilemma. A 
sufficiently large monetary deposit achieves this by producing an initial burst 
of confidence that stabilizes the agreement and keeps the tragedy of the 
commons at bay. Ex ante signaling, if sufficiently robust, can short-circuit a 
tragedy of the commons before it forms and is a far safer method of inducing 
compliance given the implicit fragility of MEAs. Indeed, the CMF’s deposit 
 
 90.  ISMAIL SERAGELDIN & JOAN MARTIN-BROWN, PARTNERSHIPS FOR GLOBAL ECOSYSTEM 
MANAGEMENT 147 (1997). 
 91.  See AARON SCHWABACH, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES: A REFERENCE 
HANDBOOK 29–30 (2006). 
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scheme should be understood not as an ex post compliance mechanism, but 
rather as an ex ante signaling device. 
Signaling models of international agreements are discussed in the 
international law literature.92 Such models are conceptually related to 
credible commitment theory, the basic idea being that actors credibly signal 
their commitment to carry out obligations in the face of future, yet-unrealized 
incentives to renege.93 The “essential feature of credible commitment theory 
is that states must be willing to pay a nontrivial cost in order to participate in 
the agreement. It is the willingness to bear these costs that makes the 
agreement more credible than it would otherwise be.”94 The literature 
distinguishes between ex post costs paid only in the case of non-compliance, 
and ex ante costs paid in advance.95 These function very differently—“[h]igh 
ex ante costs send a credible signal of intentions: No rational government 
would pay a high ‘down payment’ on a cooperative enterprise if they did not 
intend to carry it out. High ex ante costs in effect screen governments by 
type, revealing their true intentions.”96 
In game theory, a party with private, but nonverifiable information as 
to their intentions can signal that information by their choice of behavior.97 
This is known in the literature as costly signaling (the conceptual analog to 
credible commitment theory in the political science literature).98 The CMF 
 
 92.  Simmons, supra note 73, at 276. Much of this has focused on the process of treaty ratification 
as a signal of commitment. See generally, e.g., LISA L. MARTIN, DEMOCRATIC COMMITMENTS: 
LEGISLATURES AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION (2000) (examining the impact of institutionalized 
legislative participation on the credibility of state commitments). 
 93.  Simmons, supra note 73, at 276. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id.; see also generally James D. Fearon, Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands 
Versus Sinking Costs, 41 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 68 (1997). 
 96.  Simmons, supra note 73, at 276. 
 97.  See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 151–58 (1994) (using a case 
study involving penalty clauses in contract negotiations to show how parties can signal non-verifiable 
information). 
 98.  The earliest work on signaling games was A.M. Spence’s model of education signaling. See 
generally Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 90 Q. J. OF ECON. 225 (1973). However, Thorsten 
Veblen in his study of conspicuous consumption should be credited with first postulating the idea of 
signaling. THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS (1899). The role of signaling has been 
extensively studied in economics. See generally In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, Signaling Games and 
Stable Equilibria, 102 Q. J OF ECON. 179 (1987). For a good overview of signaling games in relation to 
the prisoner’s dilemma, see PRAJIT K. DUTTA, STRATEGIES AND GAMES: THEORY AND PRACTICE 
383−402 (1999). The impact of signaling may of course be increased if it is costly—a dynamic known in 
both economics and biology as costly signaling, the basis of costly signaling theory (CST). For CST’s 
economic embodiment, Spence’s work is the foundational piece. I provide a more extensive overview of 
CST elsewhere (in the field of biology as well as economics). See Bryan Druzin, Law, Selfishness, and 
Signals: An Expansion of Posner’s Signaling Theory of Social Norms, 24 CANADIAN J. OF L. & JURIS. 5, 
26−27 (2011) (arguing that norm internalization is an adaptive quality that enhances the individual’s 
ability to signal cooperation); see also generally Bryan Druzin, Eating Peas with One’s Fingers: A 
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is designed to facilitate costly signaling and preemptively thwart the 
emergence of a tragedy of the commons by building sufficient confidence 
among member states that they are equally committed to compliance. Ex post 
costs function in an entirely different manner—such penalties do not screen 
actors; rather, they constrain their behavior.99 With respect to overcoming a 
tragedy of the commons, this is a crucial difference. Ex post penalties are far 
weaker signals. While ex post penalties also communicate commitment in 
that parties willingly subject themselves to these measures, the signal is less 
robust because it is unclear if the party will actually incur the penalty. In 
many cases, an actor will simply withdraw from the agreement at a later 
stage. In other cases, sanctioning mechanisms are rarely used even when they 
are available.100 In actual practice, collective enforcement through penalties 
and binding judicial processes such as dispute settlement remain relatively 
rare.101 States rarely invoke enforcement mechanisms.102 There are several 
reasons for this. The imposition of sanctions is costly for the sanctioning 
state or states.103 In many cases, states are simply reluctant to bear the burden 
of imposing sanctions on non-compliant parties.104 Indeed, theorists “have 
long recognized that, with few exceptions, enforcement—from military 
action, to economic sanctions, to diplomatic hardball—is costly.105 Where 
they are available, treaty-based sanctions are actually seldom used.106 In fact, 
most treaties do not incorporate enforcement mechanisms of any kind.107 
As such, it makes more sense to impose costs on the “front end” of a 
treaty. This allows parties to signal their commitment at a far more crucial 
 
Semiotic Approach to Law and Social Norms, 26 INT’L J. SEMIOTIC L. 257 (2013) (proposing a signaling 
theory of social norms). The role of signaling in repeated games has been comprehensively studied both 
empirically and theoretically. See, e.g., MOHAMMED ABDELLAOUI, UNCERTAINTY AND RISK: MENTAL, 
FORMAL, EXPERIMENTAL REPRESENTATIONS 280 (2007). For a good summary of the work on signaling 
in the economics literature, see DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 645−54 
(1990).  
 99.  Simmons, supra note 73, at 277. 
 100.  ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY REGIMES 32−33 (1995).  
 101.  UNEP, supra note 77, at 7.  
 102.  WALTER CARLSNAES ET AL., HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 367 (2012). There 
has in fact been a shift away from coercive mechanisms such as sanctions towards a more “managerial” 
approach which instead favours positive mechanisms such as transparency and capacity-building. See 
GEIR ULFSTEIN, MAKING TREATIES WORK: HUMAN RIGHTS, ENVIRONMENT AND ARMS CONTROL 373 
(2007).  
 103.  ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA H. CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 33 (2009). 
 104.  See CARLSNAES, supra note 102, at 367. 
 105.  Id.  
 106.  REGINA S. AXELROD & STACY D. VANDEVEER, THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT: INSTITUTIONS, 
LAW, AND POLICY 124−25 (2014).  
 107.  See BARRETT, supra note 84, at 254. 
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stage, nudging perceptions in the right direction and thereby stymieing the 
emergence of a tragedy of the commons. Communicating commitment 
through ex ante signaling better suits a tragedy of the commons dynamic 
because it is preventative rather than punitive. A tragedy of the commons 
dynamic is unique because it turns on expectations regarding the strength of 
other parties’ commitment. An initial burst of confidence, if sufficiently 
powerful, can stabilize the agreement and prevent a tragedy of the commons 
from emerging. The core problem with agreements that do not involve a 
tragedy of the commons dynamic is that cooperation may be difficult to 
sustain if incentive structures change, but this is not the primary problem 
with agreements grappling with a tragedy of the commons (although this 
may also occur). Rather, the core problem is that parties otherwise willing to 
cooperate are forced to cheat because they cannot risk trusting other players, 
which initiates a downward spiral into non-cooperation. 
Traditional compliance mechanisms are designed to prevent defection 
in the face of shifting incentive structures. Even if parties initially intend to 
comply, they may later renege due to a change in incentives. This is not the 
case with the tragedy of the commons (at least it is not the primary problem). 
A tragedy of the commons is unique in that all parties may continually wish 
to comply throughout the collapse of a treaty; however, the agreement may 
nevertheless collapse. This is an important difference. The dynamic in a 
tragedy of the commons is fundamentally different than in other cooperation 
scenarios and therefore calls for a fundamentally different solution—i.e. a 
greater use of ex ante signaling. The CMF is such a solution—it is a system 
for clear ex ante signaling designed to defuse the tragedy of the commons 
before it emerges. The CMF is essentially a massive signaling device—it is 
a tool to amplify commitment signaling during the early stages of an 
agreement when trust is at a premium. 
C.  Key Features of the Commons Management Fund 
Several features of the CMF distinguish it from traditional compliance 
mechanisms. This final section of the discussion notes some of these 
features. 
1.  Commercial Signaling to Treaty Signaling 
The CMF in fact mirrors strategies employed by commercial actors 
operating under similar conditions of distrust. The CMF simply imports this 
same process to the supranational level of treaty compliance between states. 
In commercial relationships lacking third party enforcement (or where such 
enforcement is unreliable or costly), private parties credibly signal their 
commitment through various means. This signaling often takes the form of 
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non-refundable deposits, deeds of guarantee, or large sums of money being 
held in escrow. For example, while the purpose of the damage deposit 
provided by a tenant renting property is to compensate the landlord for any 
ex post damage that may occur, the deposit in fact serves a second, less 
obvious function. It is a powerful signaling device—it credibly signals the 
tenant’s intention to exercise care and maintain the property. A financially-
able tenant unwilling to pay a damage deposit would signal something about 
her commitment to properly care for the property. Commercial relationships 
are chalk full of commitment signaling, often in very subtle ways. For 
instance, two companies with plans to collaborate will often signal their 
commitment by early investments in sunk costs, such as costly machinery, 
office space rentals, etc. This ex ante commitment signaling instills 
immediate confidence in the authenticity of the other party’s commitment to 
the agreement. Such behavior allows parties to correctly decipher in advance 
the time horizons of other actors. 
What is true with respect to agreements between private commercial 
parties is also true for international states parties to treaties. Indeed, treaties 
often provide repeated opportunities to signal commitment through 
staggered stages of performance in order to sustain cooperation.108 Consider 
the terms of the New START treaty, which call for a number of specific 
actions within designated periods covering a period extending from the first 
few days after entering into force up to the entire ten-year life of the treaty.109 
This structure provides for rounds of commitment signaling (concentrated in 
the early stages of the treaty where there is a poverty of trust) before parties 
progress to subsequent stages of the treaty. For instance, the New START 
treaty calls for an exchange of inspector information within the first twenty-
five days after entry into force;110 the provision of information on the 
numbers, locations, and technical characteristics of weapon systems no later 
than forty-five days;111 an exhibition of strategic offensive arms no later than 
sixty days;112 the one-time exhibition of U.S. heavy bombers no later than 
 
 108.  I discuss this idea elsewhere where I term the concept performance signaling theory. Pertinent 
to the present discussion is the concept of signal-induced trust I have articulated in an earlier article. See 
generally Bryan Druzin, Opening the Machinery of Private Order: Public International Law as a Form 
of Private Ordering, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 423 (2014). 
 109.  Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the 
Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, U.S.-Russ., Apr. 8, 2010, S. TREATY 
DOC. NO. 111-5 (2010). The following account of New START is largely drawn from a previous 
description I have provided elsewhere. See Druzin, supra note 23, at  460−61.  
 110.  Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on 
Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, U.S.-Russ., pt. 4, § 
VI(5), Apr. 8, 2010, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 111-5 (2010).  
 111.  Id. at pt. 2, § I (3). 
 112.  Id. at pt. 5, §§ I (2), VIII(2). 
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120 days;113 and so on. This signaling structure encourages compliance even 
in the absence of third-party enforcement. The CMF builds on the same 
premise. However, unlike treaties which rely on static rounds of signaling 
embedded into a treaty regime, the CMF model possesses several unique 
features that should be noted. 
2.  Signaling Strength is Adjustable 
A particularly useful aspect of the CMF is that the signal strength is 
adjustable to whatever level of intensity the stakeholders wish to make it—
the larger the sum, the more costly the signal and thus the more credible each 
agent’s commitment to the agreement. To use a colloquialism: the CMF 
allows parties to an agreement “to put one’s money where one’s mouth is.” 
The fact that the deposit  is adjustable provides a tremendous degree of 
flexibility. The strength of the signal can be varied in relation to the precise 
circumstances of the agreement. It may be that in some cases a large deposit 
may not be required. Assuming a sufficient degree of monitoring, credible 
commitment may be signaled by setting the deposit amount just high enough 
to negate any potential benefit gained through noncompliance. The signal 
strength need only be powerful enough to convince parties that there is 
sufficient incentive for the majority of member states to comply. The 
stakeholders can calibrate the deposit sum accordingly. 
The deposit need not be an unbreakable firewall against all defection—
it need only significantly reduce the likelihood of defection and thereby 
maintain the impression that the agreement is robust. If the agreement is 
perceived as robust, it will be robust. In many circumstances, a minimal 
deposit may be sufficient to successfully inculcate this belief and prevent 
stakeholders from sliding into a tragedy of the commons out of mistrust. 
Treaty members may anticipate that some parties might still exit the treaty; 
however, so long as parties believe that the majority of the treaty members 
will keep their commitments, a negative bandwagon will not form. 
In some cases a stronger signal may be needed. For instance, in periods 
of potential treaty instability brought about by unanticipated exogenous 
shocks (e.g., political shifts, sudden changes in market price or supply, etc.), 
the deposit sum may be increased to boost the signal strength in order to re-
stabilize the treaty. A fresh round of signaling can short-circuit a negative 
bandwagon before it takes hold. The signal strength may also be adjusted 
downward. For instance, after a long period of treaty stability that has 
successfully fostered robust norms of cooperation, heavy signaling may no 
longer be required and so the deposit burden may be lightened accordingly. 
 
 113.  Id. at pt. 9, Fourth Agreed Statement, 3. 
DRUZIN - FOR PUBLICATION(DO NOT DELETE) 11/28/2016  9:06 AM 
2016] THE PARCHED EARTH OF COOPERATION 103 
Other cases may call for entirely different approaches. For instance, if 
governments are initially reluctant to make such a significant commitment, 
the deposit sum may be incrementally increased over a period of time, 
ratcheting up the signal in a graduated fashion. This will render the treaty 
less robust in the beginning phase but may be the only option when faced 
with a group of reluctant parties. 
Whatever the case, the framework provides a high degree of flexibility: 
the simplicity of the CMF allows member states to adjust an agreement’s 
signal strength to the precise level needed. This is a powerful feature of the 
model. 
3.  Can Be Grafted onto Existing Agreements 
The CMF can be used to bolster existing treaties. The CMF is 
essentially a “heavy” signaling mechanism that may be grafted onto existing 
or future multilateral environmental agreements to strengthen compliance. 
Such an approach would not conflict with existing normative frameworks 
for multilateral environmental agreements. Indeed, guideline 14(d) of the 
UNEP Manual on Compliance with and Enforcement of Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements114 suggests the introduction of various 
techniques to enhance compliance.115 Tethering a multilateral environmental 
agreement to a corollary agreement under the CMF could be considered such 
a technique to compel compliance. In principle, the CMF can be generalized 
to augment and strengthen compliance for any type of treaty—it need not be 
restricted to multilateral environmental agreements. The CMF may be used 
to reinforce and strengthen compliance for any agreement between 
international actors. However, for reasons already discussed, it is particularly 
effective in strengthening MEAs because it is ideally suited to address 
tragedy of the commons scenarios where all parties desire coordination, but 
are nonetheless driven to uncooperative outcomes. 
4.  The Model is Scalable 
The framework could be open to actors on all scales of governance—
from the regional to the global level. The CMF allows for extraordinary 
flexibility in this respect. The CMF can reinforce treaty-based governance 
on any scale, facilitating the creation of tailor-made regional based MEAs 
 
 114.  Guideline 14(d) states that countries “can consider the inclusion of non-compliance provisions 
in a multilateral environmental agreement, with a view to assisting parties having compliance problems 
and addressing individual cases of non-compliance, taking into account the importance of tailoring 
compliance provisions and mechanisms to the agreement’s specific obligations.” UNEP, supra note 77, 
at 116. 
 115.  These may be warnings, trade sanctions, withdrawal or suspension of privileges, and other 
punitive measures. See id. at 103–22.  
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rather than fixed environmental protocols at the global level. Such an 
approach is advantageous in that parties on regional levels are arguably 
better equipped to set realistic conservation targets and gauge the size of 
deposits necessary to thwart a tragedy of the commons. Regional agreements 
can be tailored to offset specific factors that threaten to undermine 
coordination at the regional level. Global environmental protocols that 
require a broad base of commitment across many governments with targets 
that may be unrealistic for certain parties are more susceptible to collapse 
because they are more vulnerable to a negative bandwagon. As such, a ready-
made governance mechanism like the CMF, available to parties on any scale 
of interaction, could engender more robust international environmental 
governance. In principle, there is no reason why even private actors could 
not register their agreements with the CMF. The CMF is a governance 
structure that remains accessible to all—from private parties to state actors. 
The CMF can function on the most regional level or it can be scaled up to 
include in its sweep the entire international community. 
5.  Coordination is Easy to Achieve 
As we have seen, the disadvantage of common-pool resources is that 
they are highly susceptible to the tragedy of the commons.  Their advantage, 
however, is that, because all actors desire cooperation, it does not take much 
to trigger it. The stakeholders desire cooperation so long as others also 
cooperate. Thus, if the correct measures are put in place, a stable 
coordination equilibrium is not difficult to achieve. This provides the CMF 
a significant advantage over other treaty types. The tragedy of the commons 
is a truly unique dynamic in that parties desire compliance, but are 
structurally driven toward non-compliance. It will often be the case, 
therefore, that only gentle shifts in perception are necessary to generate 
stability and thwart the emergence of a tragedy of the commons. The critical 
issue is the collective expectation that a sufficient number of actors will 
comply. While agreements exhibiting a tragedy of the commons dynamic are 
susceptible to collapse, the upside is that because such agreements revolve 
around collective expectations, coordination can be easily attained if the 
correct measures are implemented at early stages. In non-tragedy-of-the-
commons type treaties, defection incentives may fluctuate wildly. Heavy-
handed enforcement mechanisms are thus required. This is not the case with 
agreements imperiled by a tragedy of the commons. The remedy may be 
extremely light-touch. While common-pool resources are pre-disposed to the 
tragedy of the commons, its emergence can be easily averted with sufficient 
signaling. Again, the stakeholders desire compliance—we need only provide 
an environment in which it is rational for them to do so. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
The question at the heart of the ecological crisis before us is essentially 
this: how can the international community successfully coordinate without a 
dominant coercive authority to keep states in line? The “dominant view in 
international relations—shared by a broad range of scholars working in the 
rationalist tradition—recognizes that agreements that cannot be enforced by 
a third party must in some sense be self-enforcing.”116 But how are we to 
achieve this? Short of a global empire, top-down regulation is not an 
option—the community of nations must somehow regulate itself. Given 
everything we know about the difficulty of sustaining cooperation in 
decentralized governance situations and the current political fragmentation 
of the world, this is not an easy task. Yet we do not have the luxury of waiting 
for the slow advance of global governance—we must accelerate this process 
through every means at our disposal. Governments need to stick to the 
international commitments they make, but for this there needs to be 
executive authority in some form. Without effective governance structures, 
treaties will reliably fail as parties spiral into the self-defeating morass of 
mutual distrust. 
 
The Commons Management Fund is such a governance structure. 
Technically understood, the CMF is a regulatory solution. It is, however, 
bottom-up rather than top-down. This distinction is important because the 
decentralized juridical nature of the current world order requires a bottom-
up approach to achieve cooperation—there is no alternative. Ultimately, the 
CMF’s viability is difficult to predict. The only true test of the approach will 
come with actual implementation, after which the plan’s efficacy would 
simply be an empirical question. What is not difficult to predict, however, is 
this: given the seriousness of the global ecological crisis before us, if 
meaningful action on a massive transnational scale is not undertaken now, 
our ability to collectively course-correct will soon reach a threshold where it 
will become impossible to do so. 
 
 
 116.  Simmons, supra note 75, at 275. 
